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 1 Introduction
Empirically, personal discount rates vary to a signiﬁcant degree among people. For
example, Warner and Pleeter (2001) use data from the US military downsizing pro-
gram of the early 1990’s to estimate the discount rates of separatees who could
choose between an annuity and a lump-sum payment. Their estimates of discount
rates range from 0 to over 30%. Frederick et al. (2002) survey articles that try
to estimate the annual discount rate of individuals. Across and within the various
studies there is a tremendous variance in results which take values from zero to
inﬁnity, with some results even being negative. These ﬁndings seem to underline
the relevance of accounting for diﬀerent time preferences among consumers. How-
ever, this issue has to our knowledge not received attention so far in the context of
insurance markets.
Since the typical insurance contract requires insurees to pay the premium up-
front for several periods (e.g. months), there exists a role for time preference in the
consumers’ ex-ante valuation of the contract. The aim of this article is to analyze
the eﬀects of diﬀerences in the personal discount rate of individuals in a competitive
insurance market. For this purpose we employ a two-period model with both moral
hazard and adverse selection in the spirit of de Meza and Webb (2001). However, it
is assumed that the informational asymmetry is not with regard to risk aversion but
the individuals’ personal discount rate, which can either be high (impatient) or low
(patient). This corresponds to a low (impatient) or high (patient) discount factor.
The discount factor will be used for modelling purposes throughout this article.
We show that there exists a separating equilibrium in which patient consumers
use high eﬀort and buy a proﬁt-making insurance contract. In contrast, impatient
consumers use low eﬀort and buy a contract with lower cover than the patient con-
sumers or even prefer to remain uninsured. In this sense, accounting for diﬀerences
in the personal discount rate helps to explain both positive proﬁts and the opposite
of adverse selection (“advantageous” selection as it is called by de Meza and Webb).
This ﬁnding contrasts with traditional models of adverse selection in insurance,
for example as represented by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), which predict that it is
the high risks who are more keen on buying insurance. Furthermore, in competitive
insurance markets there are usually zero proﬁts for insurers. However, there is some
evidence which does not seem to ﬁt these predictions. Dionne et al. (2001) criticize
an empirical study by Puelz and Snow (1994) which ﬁnds that adverse selection is a
relevant problem for automobile insurance. They show that under reﬁned estimation
2methods the result cannot be conﬁrmed. Cawley and Philipson (1999) analyze
whether data from life insurance is consistent with the adverse selection hypothesis.
They report that in several regards the data exhibits the opposite of the expected
pattern. For example, there is a negative covariance between risk and quantity. This
suggests that it is actually the low risks who are inclined to buy more insurance.
In an empirical study of the Australian general insurance industry, Murat et al.
(2002) ﬁnd that insurers are able to sustain a considerable amount of market power.
This result is obtained since insurers do not completely pass on increases in their
production costs to consumers. However, this would be expected from a perfectly
competitive industry, as it has no leeway to bear part of the cost increases itself. A
further hint that market power may exist at least in some insurance sectors comes
from Nissan and Caveny (2001) who ﬁnd that some lines of property and liability
insurance in the US are signiﬁcantly more concentrated than a comparable collection
of other industries.
We also explore to what extent random contracts and diﬀerentiated contracts
may allow insurers to better screen the market. We show that ex-ante random-
ization, where the result of the lottery is revealed before the choice of eﬀort, can
indeed achieve a better separation of types. Therefore, premiums for patient cus-
tomers are driven down by competition until proﬁts disappear. The downside of
ex-ante randomization is that in this model it is equivalent to the quite unrealistic
idea of throwing the dice in the insurance agent’s oﬃce in order to determine which
contract the insuree will be oﬀered. A more realistic way of thinking about random-
ization is, when the result of the lottery is revealed only after the choice of eﬀort.
Such randomness might be achieved in practice by linking the indemnity payment
to criteria which are out of the insuree’s control, e.g. the precise circumstances of
an accident. We show that ex-post randomization does not improve the screening
capabilities of the market.
A diﬀerent way of how insurers can further screen between patient and impatient
customers is to make explicit use of the consumers’ diﬀerent time preferences. This
can be done by diﬀerentiating the insurance product into a relatively expensive full
service policy and a cheaper discount policy with less services. We assume that
the service level is deﬁned by the time it takes until the indemnity is paid out in
case the customer reports a loss. The impatient types are inclined to buy full service
insurance whereas the patient types do not mind the delayed payment of indemnities
under discount insurance that much.
3This article draws on de Meza and Webb (2001) who develop a model which can
explain the opposite of adverse selection in a competitive insurance market. This
follows from adverse selection on risk aversion in the simultaneous presence of moral
hazard. Consumers are split into timid and bold people, whereby the bold ones
are less risk averse. They can choose between a high or low level of unobservable
precautionary eﬀort in order to avoid the loss. De Meza and Webb show that for
certain parameter values a unique separating equilibrium exists in which timid indi-
viduals buy insurance and employ high eﬀort whereas bold ones remain uninsured
and employ low eﬀort. In contrast to de Meza and Webb, adverse selection in the
present model occurs regarding the consumers’ personal time preferences.
This work is linked to the literature on multi dimensional adverse selection
(Smart (2000), Villeneuve (2003), Wambach (2000)). Those models can also lead to
proﬁt making contracts where however the higher risks buy more coverage. In these
models with multi dimensional adverse selection undercutting the proﬁt-making
equilibrium contract will attract (loss-making) high risks, while in our work under-
cutting attracts (loss-making) impatient types which exert low eﬀort.
Theoretical models of asymmetric information in the insurance market can be
grouped according to whether they employ pure adverse selection (e.g. Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1976)), pure moral hazard (e.g. Arnott and Stiglitz (1988)), or a com-
bination of both (e.g. de Meza and Webb (2001) or the present model). Both pure
theories on their own suggest that in equilibrium a higher cover implies a higher risk,
thus leading to a positive correlation between cover and loss probability. In a recent
article, Chiappori et al. (2005) establish sets of conditions under which this positive
correlation property follows also from models with simultaneous moral hazard and
adverse selection. The present model satisﬁes one set of these conditions, which
require that the consumers know their loss probabilities and their risk aversion be
identical and publicly known. Interestingly, there can still be a negative correlation
between loss probability and cover. The reason for this discrepancy is that diﬀerent
personal discount rates translate into diﬀerent curvatures of patient and impatient
types’ present value indiﬀerence curves. This is equivalent to diﬀerent risk aversions
in a one-period model.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we describe the model. Section 3
analyses diﬀerent equilibrium conﬁgurations. In section 4, extensions to the model
are provided. We conclude in section 5.
42 The Model
The model we employ in this chapter consists of a game with 4 stages throughout 2
periods:
1) Insurance companies make irrevocable oﬀers of contracts that specify both
premium P and indemnity I.
2) Clients buy at most one contract from one insurance company. When buying
insurance, a client has to pay the premium P up-front.
3) The consumer decides which unobservable eﬀort level e to choose in order to
avoid the loss.
4) The loss occurs or not and the indemnity is paid out in case of a loss.
Stages 1 to 3 take place in period 1, whereas stage 4 takes place in period 2.
Insurers
There are two or more risk neutral insurers in the market who compete in con-
tracts. There is informational asymmetry regarding the patience type of consumers:
Insurers know the distribution of patience types in society, but they cannot iden-
tify the patience type of an individual who wants to buy a contract. Furthermore,
the consumers’ utility function, the two available eﬀort levels and the resulting loss
probabilities are also known by the insurers. This enables them to conjecture the
eﬀort level employed by insurees of each type under any contract correctly, even
though eﬀort is unobservable.
For simplicity, we make the following assumption on the discounting made by
the insurers.
Assumption 1 It is assumed that the market interest rate is zero.
Consumers
It is assumed that the consumers’ ex-ante expected utility EU can be described by
EU =U(w − P) + δ
 
[1 − s(e)]U(w) + s(e)U(w − L + I)
 
−c(e)
with U being a concave, time-additive utility function with exogenously given risk
aversion. Premium is denoted by P and indemnity by I. Furthermore, there is pe-
riod income w, personal discount factor δ, eﬀort e with e ∈ {el,eh}, loss probability
5s(e) with s(eh) < s(el), costs of eﬀort c(e) with c(el) < c(eh) and loss L. To simplify
notation we deﬁne sn := s(en) and cn := c(en) for n ∈ {h,l}.
The level of eﬀort is chosen and paid for in the ﬁrst period, whereas the beneﬁt
of the eﬀort is in eﬀect in the future. This way of modelling eﬀort is especially
adequate when it is a technical necessity to make precautionary provisions before or
at the very beginning of the insurance contract. For example, when building a house
the agent can decide whether or not to use ﬁre-retardant materials. This investment
will carry on its beneﬁcial eﬀect over the policy period of a ﬁre insurance. Another
example is travel health insurance. Here the insuree can decide whether or not to
get vaccinated before departure. Sometimes an audit conducted by the insurer in
case a loss is reported allows to infer the eﬀort level employed to a certain extent.
However, a perfect inference seems to be unlikely in many cases. Then the two eﬀort
levels in this model can be interpreted as the residual consumer’s discretion with
regard to eﬀort which cannot be detected in an audit anymore.
The population shall be split up in a fraction γ of patient people with a high
discount factor δp and a fraction 1−γ of impatient people with a low discount factor
δi.
Via the implicit function theorem, the slope of the consumers’ indiﬀerence curves
IC in the premium-indemnity space (ﬁgure 1, page 11) can be veriﬁed to be
S(δ,e,P,I) :=
dP
dI




e
=
δs(e)U′(w − L + I)
U′(w − P)
> 0. (1)
For extremely low patience with δ = 0, the indiﬀerence curve is a ﬂat horizontal
line. With increasing δ, the indiﬀerence curve becomes steeper at every given point
in the premium-indemnity space (ﬁgure 1).
Given the same eﬀort level e, the indiﬀerence curve of a patient type ICp is
steeper than the indiﬀerence curve of an impatient type ICi for any contract {P,I}.
This can be seen by computing the derivative of (1) with respect to δ:
∂S(δ,e,P,I)
∂δ

 

e
=
s(e)U′(w − L + I)
U′(w − P)
> 0.
Furthermore, consumers’ indiﬀerence curves are concave:
dS(δ,e,P,I)
dI
=
δs(e)U′′(w − L + I)
U′(w − P)
< 0.
In the equilibrium analysis, we sometimes make the following assumption con-
cerning the slopes of the indiﬀerence curves.
6Assumption 2 Even under high eﬀort eh, a patient type (δp) has a steeper indif-
ference curve than an impatient type (δi) under low eﬀort el for any contract {P,I}.
According to (1), this requires that δpsh > δisl. This ”single-crossing” condition
implies that indiﬀerence curves of the patient and impatient type only cross once,
even if they employ diﬀerent eﬀort levels. The typical loss probability in most lines
of insurance can be considered relatively small in comparison to the typical discount
rate as suggested by the literature cited above. Therefore, the condition does not
seem overly restrictive as long as a low level of precautionary eﬀort does not cause
sl to skyrocket too much. Furthermore, the possibility of an audit may impose a
lower bound on el. Later on we also discuss the situation where this assumption is
not satisﬁed.
Eﬀort border
Depending on parameter values, there may be a border line in the premium-indemnity
space which describes when a certain patience type is exactly indiﬀerent between
high and low eﬀort. To determine this eﬀort border EB we compute a consumer’s
advantage in expected utility from employing high eﬀort:
A(δ) := EUh − EUl = δ[sl − sh]
 
U(w) − U(w − L + I)
 
−(ch − cl)
If A(δ) is positive, it pays to employ high eﬀort, whereas otherwise the individual is
better oﬀ employing low eﬀort.
In order to obtain a condition under which the individual is indiﬀerent between
high and low eﬀort, we set A(δ) equal to zero and obtain:
U(w − L + I) = U(w) −
ch − cl
δ(sl − sh)
(2)
When the individual switches from high eﬀort eh to low eﬀort el (e.g. while P
is constant and I increases marginally), it becomes apparent from (1) that the
indiﬀerence curve exhibits a kink at the eﬀort border, as its slope becomes steeper.
The indiﬀerence curve of the patient type ICp in ﬁgure 1 gives an example.
According to (2), the position of the kink is determined by the following factors:
• the position of the kink does not depend on P, so the curve of kinks (eﬀort
border) is a linear vertical line in the premium-indemnity space.
7• a larger δ moves the kink to the right in premium space, so that patient types
employ high eﬀort for levels of indemnity where impatient types would employ
low eﬀort,
• a larger diﬀerence in loss probabilities for low and high eﬀort (sl − sh) and a
larger loss L move the kink to the right in the premium-indemnity space
• a larger cost diﬀerence between high and low eﬀort (ch − cl) moves the kink to
the left. This is also the case for a larger w if I < L, because U is concave.
If the circumstances are such that the eﬀort border of a patience type is located
at an indemnity level of zero or below, the individuals of this patience type never
employ high eﬀort.
3 Equilibria
We assume that at stage 2 consumers buy the best contract available. If two or more
insurers oﬀer the same optimal contract, clients randomize with equal probability.
Eﬀort is chosen accordingly. Thus we can concentrate on the decision of the insurer
at stage 1.
3.1 Characteristics of diﬀerent Equilibria
Before analyzing equilibria of the model, we outline the properties of separating and
pooling equilibria, following de Meza and Webb (2001). The outside option contract
(no insurance) is denoted by O.
Separating Equilibrium
A separating equilibrium is characterized by the following four properties, whereby
C∗
n with n ∈ {i,p} stands for the contract chosen by type n in equilibrium.
Incentive compatibility
There must be no incentive for an impatient type to buy the contract for a patient
type and vice versa:
EUi(C
∗
i ) ≥ EUi(C
∗
p)
EUp(C
∗
p) ≥ EUp(C
∗
i )
8Eﬀort incentives
Since eﬀort is unobservable, the individual employs high eﬀort only if this is advan-
tageous in terms of a higher expected utility:
e =
 
eh, if A(δ) ≥ 0
el, if A(δ) < 0
Participation
Consumers cannot be forced to buy insurance, but they insure themselves voluntar-
ily, if this results in a higher expected utility than the outside option of remaining
uninsured:
EUn(C
∗
n) ≥ EUn(O) for n ∈ {i,p}
Proﬁt maximization
By oﬀering C∗
i and C∗
p each insurer maximizes his proﬁt, given that C∗
i and C∗
p are
oﬀered by his competitors. No insurer can earn more by oﬀering a diﬀerent contract
or by oﬀering no contract at all.1
Pooling Equilibrium
A pooling equilibrium C∗ is characterized by the following three properties:
Eﬀort incentives
e =
 
eh, if A(δ) ≥ 0
el, if A(δ) < 0
Participation
EUn(C
∗) ≥ EUn(O) for n ∈ {i,p}
Proﬁt maximization
Given that C∗ is oﬀered by his competitors, each insurer maximizes his proﬁt by
oﬀering C∗.
3.2 Analysis of Equilibria
The situations which arise from the various parameter constellations can be grouped
according to which types employ high eﬀort at least in some area of the contract
space. Possible answers are none, only the patient types or both types. Since the
1To concentrate on the economics of this problem we allow for single contract deviation only.
In section 4 we consider multi contract deviations.
9case in which no one ever employs high eﬀort is not very interesting, we concentrate
on the latter two cases. In this section we analyse the simpler case where the
impatient patient types never exerts high eﬀort. The other case is analysed in the
following section.
Impatient types do not employ high eﬀort under any contract
The analysis in this section is characterized by the following property:
P-1 The impatient types do never employ high eﬀort but there is a region for the
patient types in the contract space where they employ high eﬀort. Formally:
δi ≤
ch − cl
(sl − sh)(U(w) − U(w − L))
< δp
This is to say that the eﬀort border of the impatient types EBi is not visible
in the premium-indemnity space, as it is located at a weakly negative indemnity.
However, the eﬀort border of the patient types EBp is located at a strictly positive
indemnity, as shown in ﬁgure 1.
Separating Equilibrium
The resulting equilibria can be seen most easily by proceeding diagrammatically.
Figure 1 depicts the contract space (premium-indemnity space). The concave lines
are indiﬀerence curves of the patient types (ICp) and the impatient types (ICi),
respectively. At some critical indemnity level, there is the patient types’ eﬀort
border EBp. To the left of it they voluntarily employ high eﬀort, as their expected
utility is higher than under low eﬀort. To the right of it they employ low eﬀort.
Switching to the low eﬀort level makes the loss probability jump from sh to sl.
Therefore, the patient types’ indiﬀerence curves have a kink at their eﬀort border,
because insurance is now more valuable again.
The insurance company’s fair premium lines for high and low eﬀort are straight
lines with slope sh and sl, respectively, because it is assumed that the insurer is risk
neutral and that the market interest rate is zero. The fair pooling line describes
all contracts which yield zero proﬁt for the insurer, if they are bought by the whole
population of patient and impatient people. This line jumps at the eﬀort border
line, as here the risk of the patient types jumps from sl to sh.
Regarding equilibrium, we distinguish between two cases. This is because the
relevant indiﬀerence curve of the impatient types can cut the patient types’ eﬀort
border below (ﬁgure 1) or above (ﬁgure 3, page 14) the fair pooling line (point B).
10P
I
fair premium line
under low eﬀort
fair premium line
under high eﬀort
fair pooling
ICp
ICi
low eﬀort high eﬀort
EBp
A
B
C
D
E
O
Figure 1: Contract space in a two-period competitive insurance market where consumers
diﬀer in patience. There is a unique separating equilibrium in which the impatient types
employ low eﬀort and buy zero-proﬁt contract D with low indemnity, whereas the patient
types employ high eﬀort and buy proﬁt-making contract E with high indemnity.
Proposition 1 Assume P-1 holds and that the impatient types’ discount factor δi is
such that ICi through D (or O, if impatient types prefer being uninsured) (ﬁgure 1)
cuts EBp above A but below B at some point E, and ICp through E is always below
the fair pooling line. If assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then there exists the following
unique separating equilibrium: The patient types employ high eﬀort and buy the
proﬁtable contract E. If U′(w) < δiU′(w−L), the impatient types employ low eﬀort
and buy zero-proﬁt contract D which has lower cover than contract E. Otherwise,
the impatient types remain uninsured.
Proof The patient types are strictly better oﬀ with contract E in comparison
to being uninsured. The impatient types are indiﬀerent between contract E and
contract D (or not being insured at all) and thus, as in Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976), it is assumed that they buy D.
Impatient types prefer to buy some insurance at their fair premium when −slU′(w−
slI)+slδiU′(w−L+I) ≥ 0 at I = 0. This condition is expressed in the proposition.
11Now we challenge contract E by considering deviations to the left of EBp. Of-
fering contracts above ICp does not make sense. This is because below ICi only
impatient types are attracted which results in losses. Contracts above ICi cannot
attract any customers. By oﬀering a contract below ICp an insurer could attract
all patient types. However, due to assumption 2, such a contract would also attract
all impatient types. Since the fair pooling line is above the deviating contract, it
necessarily leads to losses.
Deviations to the right of EBp are also loss-making. This is because in this
region both types employ low eﬀort and the patient types cannot even be attracted
away from contract E by oﬀers on the fair premium line under low eﬀort.
The patient types prefer contract E to any other contract which lies on ICi
through D (or O, if impatient types prefer to be uninsured) and is on or above the
applicable fair premium line. Therefore, there can be no other separating equilib-
rium. A pooling equilibrium would have to be on or above the fair pooling line.
Since ICp through E is always below the fair pooling line by assumption, there
cannot be a pooling equilibrium that would not be destroyed by D (or O) and E.
Uniqueness follows. ￿
Situation with assumption 2 not being satisﬁed
An interesting question to analyze at this point is what happens when assumption 2
does not hold. This means that the indiﬀerence curve of the impatient type under
low eﬀort is steeper than the indiﬀerence curve of the patient type under high eﬀort.
Suppose that the impatient types do not want to buy insurance even for their fair
premium (ICi does not touch the fair premium line under low eﬀort). Then there
are two possibilities with regard to the fair pooling line: It can either cross the
indiﬀerence curve of the patient types through O (ICp in ﬁgure 2) or not. In the
ﬁrst case, a contract on the fair pooling line dominates O, but it can always be
destroyed by a proﬁt-making deviating oﬀer which only attracts patient types. In
the end, no equilibrium exists. In the second case, which is shown in ﬁgure 2,
O is an equilibrium. This shows that consumer heterogeneity with regard to time
preference and simultaneous moral hazard may contribute to the fact that some risks
are uninsurable. A similar result is obtained by Chiu and Karni (1998) in the context
of private unemployment insurance. The authors demonstrate that adverse selection
on the employees’ preference for leisure together with moral hazard regarding the
employees’ eﬀort of working hard can explain the absence of private unemployment
12insurance as an equilibrium outcome.
P
I
fair premium line
under low eﬀort
fair premium line
under high eﬀort
fair pooling
ICp
ICi
low eﬀort high eﬀort
EBp
O
Figure 2: If assumption 2 is not satisﬁed, ICi through O does not cross the fair premium
under low eﬀort and the fair pooling line does not cross ICp, then the equilibrium contract
is O.
Pooling Equilibrium
Proposition 2 Assume P-1 holds and that the impatient types’ discount factor δi is
such that ICi through D (or O, if impatient types prefer being uninsured) (ﬁgure 3)
cuts EBp above B but below C and ICp through B is always below the fair premium
line under low eﬀort. Under assumptions 1 and 2, there exists a unique zero-proﬁt
pooling equilibrium in which the impatient types employ low eﬀort, the patient types
employ high eﬀort and both types buy contract B, if ICp at point B is steeper than
the fair pooling line to the left of EBp (condition C1). Otherwise, there exists no
equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof Suppose ﬁrst that condition C1 holds. Both types are strictly better
oﬀ buying contract B instead of remaining uninsured. Now we consider deviating
contracts to the left of EBp: Oﬀering a deviating contract above ICp through B
13P
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Figure 3: Unique zero-proﬁt pooling equilibrium in which both types buy contract B.
The impatient types employ low eﬀort, whereas the patient types employ high eﬀort.
does not make sense as no patient types can be attracted. Oﬀering a proﬁtable
deviating contract below ICp through B is loss-making since, by condition C1, such
contracts are below the fair pooling line and would also be bought by all impatient
types (assumption 2).
Deviating contracts to the right of EBp are also loss-making. This is because in
this region both types employ low eﬀort and cannot even be attracted away from B
by contracts on the fair premium line under low eﬀort.
The patient types prefer contract B to all other contracts on or above the fair
pooling line. Thus, there cannot be another pooling equilibrium. It must be that
in a candidate for a separating equilibrium the impatient types get contract D (or
O, if impatient types prefer being uninsured) and are indiﬀerent between their own
contract and the contract of the patient types which would be S. Due to incentive
compatibility, the separating contract for the patient types must be on or above ICi
through D (or O). Therefore, both types will prefer contract B to the candidate for
a separating contract and B is a unique pooling equilibrium.
14Now we consider the situation in which condition C1 does not hold which is
depicted in the box in ﬁgure 3. In this case, there is a point T to the left of EBp
where ICp is tangent to the fair pooling line. Oﬀering a contract like F close to
T which attracts both types but still is above the fair pooling line destabilizes B.
However, due to assumption 2, T is also no stable equilibrium, since a proﬁtable
deviating contract like G can be oﬀered. This reasoning holds true for any contract
on and above the fair pooling line. Since ICp is below the fair premium line under
low eﬀort there cannot be a pooling equilibrium to the right of EBp either.
Suppose S is part of a candidate for a separating equilibrium. All insurers
oﬀering S earn a proﬁt per contract which is represented by the distance AS. If
there are too many insurers oﬀering S, a deviation slightly to the south-west of S
can be proﬁtable for an individual insurer. This is the case, if the pooling proﬁt
earned by serving all consumers is greater than the share in proﬁt by serving only
patient consumers. The consequence is that no equilibrium is possible due to the
single crossing property (assumption 2) in the area to the left of EBp. Even if
there are not too many insurers oﬀering S, new entrants in the insurance market
are attracted and S is destabilized. Thus, a separating equilibrium cannot exist. In
the end, neither a pooling nor a separating equilibrium exists, if condition C1 does
not hold. ￿
4 Extensions
4.1 Multiple contracts
So far we have assumed that if insurers deviate from the equilibrium, they only
oﬀer one contract each. However, in reality insurers are oﬀering menus of contracts,
which allow for the possibility of cross-subsidization of contracts. Allowing insurers
to deviate with an oﬀer of more than one contract in our model leads to the following
results:
In case of a separating equilibrium (ﬁgure 1) the equilibrium will break down. First
note that oﬀering two contracts just ”below” D and E will attract all customers
away from the equilibrium contracts and will lead to a larger proﬁt for the deviating
insurer. The insurer will make losses with the contract for the impatient types, while
making proﬁts with the contract for the patient types. Cross-subsidizing contracts
by themselves are never an equilibrium, as any insurer would only oﬀer the proﬁt
making contract (if all others oﬀer the pair of cross-subsidizing contracts). Thus no
15equilibrium exists. In case of a pooling equilibrium (ﬁgure 3) a similar result can
be obtained. Oﬀering a contract just ”below” B and a second one, which is on the
indiﬀerence curves of the impatient type going through this contract, can lead to a
proﬁt making pair of contracts, where again the contract with the impatient type
makes a loss, while the contract for the patient type makes a proﬁt. As before, such
a pair of contracts cannot be an equilibrium.
There is a huge literature on the equilibrium non-existence problem in insurance
markets with adverse selection. It is probably fair to say that so far there has been
no general agreed upon way on how to deal with this problem. We will discuss here
two possible responses to this problem, and outline the corresponding equilibria
these will lead to.
The ﬁrst is the so-called WMS equilibrium approach (Wilson (1977), Miyazaki
(1977) , Spence (1978)) which has found a game-theoretic basis in the work by Hell-
wig (1987). In this approach, cross-subsidizing equilibrium contracts are possible,
as for any deviating menu of contract, the insurers can react by withdrawing their
contracts. Thus if someone intends to cream skim the market by oﬀering the proﬁt
making contract only, the others will withdraw their contracts so that the deviating
insurer is left with all customers and makes a loss. In our model a WMS equilib-
rium is given by contract pairs of the form described in the previous paragraph:
The patient type receives a contract on his eﬀort border line, which is such that he
employs high eﬀort and the insurer make proﬁts with this contract. The impatient
type obtains a contract on his indiﬀerence curve going through the contract for the
patient type. Insurers make losses with this contract which are such that they on
average exactly equal the proﬁts made with the patient type. Thus the result that
the higher risks buy the contract with smaller coverage remains to hold, while the
results on the proﬁt making contract and on pooling contracts do not hold anymore.
A second approach to the equilibrium non-existence problem is the Riley equi-
librium, the consequences of which have found a game theoretic basis in the work by
Inderst and Wambach (2001). Riley assumes that if deviating contracts are oﬀered,
the other insurers can respond by oﬀering new contracts themselves. This makes
oﬀering cross-subsidizing deviating contracts unattractive, as the other insurers will
respond by oﬀering only the proﬁt making contract. Therefore the deviator is left
with all the high risks and only a few if any low risks. In Inderst and Wambach it is
assumed that insurers are capacity constrained. In that case deviating by oﬀering
cross subsidizing contracts might lead to a loss as only the high risks will come to
16buy the new (loss making) contract from the deviating insurer. Although a low risk
would also proﬁt from the new (proﬁt making) contract he might not approach the
deviating insurer if there are some small costs of doing so. The reason is that as
many high risks will come, and as the insurer is capacity constrained, the insurer
will not have suﬃciently many resources to cover the whole market. In our model
the Riley equilibrium takes the form as discussed in the previous section (in Figures
1 and 3). Proﬁt making separating contracts as well as pooling contracts remain
to exist in equilibrium. Any cross-subsidizing deviation will become unattractive if
other insurers can react or if only the impatient types approach such a deviator.
This in turn justiﬁes why we concentrated in the previous section on the simpler
analysis of allowing for single contract deviations only.
4.2 Random contracts
In this section we analyze in how far random contracts can be used by insurers in
order to compete for proﬁtable customers.2 Along the lines of Arnott and Stiglitz
(1988), we can distinguish two cases with regard to timing: The realization of the
lottery can be made known to the consumer either before (ex ante) or after (ex post)
his choice of eﬀort.
Under ex-ante randomization we can think of the consumer committing to ac-
cept a contract which is the outcome of a lottery L played subsequently at the
insurance agent’s oﬃce. The resulting contract is immediately made known to the
consumer who can then decide which eﬀort level to employ. Consider contract E
in ﬁgure 1. As pointed out above, there is no proﬁtable way for an insurer to un-
dercut E with a deterministic contract. However, an insurer could oﬀer a lottery
L = {(E,X);( ,1 −  )} instead of contract E. This lottery would imply to oﬀer
contract E with probability   and contract X with probability (1 −  ), whereby
X is somewhere on ICi through E to the right of EBp. Contract E is proﬁtable,
whereas X is loss-making. Therefore, there is a certain mixing probability   for
each possible X for which the lottery yields zero proﬁt for insurers. Furthermore,
such a lottery L is strictly preferred by a patient consumer in comparison to the
deterministic contract E, because there is a probability 1−  of being better oﬀ. An
impatient consumer has nothing to gain from such a lottery, since both contracts E
and X oﬀer exactly the same utility to him. In this situation, the introduction of
2We thank Bertrand Villeneuve for suggesting this issue. Random contracts within an insurance
framework are also discussed by Arnott and Stiglitz (1988), Prescott and Townsend (1984) and
Villeneuve (2003).
17random insurance contracts indeed enables insurers to compete further for proﬁtable
clients even at point E in ﬁgure 1, until zero proﬁts are reached.
Under ex-post randomization, the consumer is presented a lottery and commits to
buying whatever contract will be the outcome. However, the uncertainty is resolved
only after the choice of eﬀort. In the present setting, ex-post randomization is
more realistic than ex-ante randomization which is not observed in practice. As
pointed out by Villeneuve (2003), ex-post randomization can be achieved by linking
the insuree’s reimbursement to criteria which are random themselves. For example,
insurers can evaluate the precise circumstances of the loss. If the insuree is found
to have been negligent, this allows for reducing the coverage payment accordingly.
However, the legal deﬁnition of negligence most often will oﬀer quite some room for
interpretation. Generally, there are many aspects with regard to the circumstances
under which the loss occurred which are out of the insuree’s control, e.g. time or
weather.
The question is now whether an ex-post randomized indemnity payment, which
is compensated by a higher expected value of the indemnity, can achieve a better
separation of types. The answer is no, which can be seen by the following argument.
The expected utility of a patient type with a contract with a random indemnity who
exerts high eﬀort is given by:
EUp = U(w − P) + δp[(1 − sh)U(w) + shU(w − L + I + ˜ ǫ)] − ch
The random variable ˜ ǫ with E(˜ ǫ) = 0 represents the randomness of the indemnity.
There exists some ˆ I < I such that the utility of the patient type stays the same
when getting the the sure indemnity ˆ I instead of the random indemnity, i.e.
EUp = U(w − P) + δp[(1 − sh)U(w) + shU(w − L + I + ˜ ǫ)] − ch
= U(w − P) + δp[(1 − sh)U(w) + shU(w − L + ˆ I)] − ch
Note that the certain indemnity ˆ I would be the same for the impatient type, i.e. it
holds:
EUi = U(w − P) + δi[(1 − sl)U(w) + slU(w − L + I + ˜ ǫ)] − cl
= U(w − P) + δi[(1 − sl)U(w) + slU(w − L + ˆ I)] − cl
This is because both types have the same utility function and hence the same risk
aversion. As in Arnott and Stiglitz (1988), the lottery over indemnities can be
replaced by the same certainty equivalent indemnity. In the end, a randomized
indemnity payment cannot achieve a better separation of types which is in line with
Arnott and Stiglitz’ (1988) proposition 10.
184.3 Impatient types employ high eﬀort under some con-
tracts
Basic Analysis
This case shall be characterized by the following properties P-2 and P-3 which ensure
that both types want to buy insurance.
P-2 Both the impatient as well as the patient types employ high eﬀort in some
region of the contract space. Formally:
ch − cl
(sl − sh)(U(w) − U(w − L))
< δi(< δp)
The parameters in (2) take values for which the indiﬀerence curves of both types
feature a kink.
P-3 The impatient types are interested in buying insurance at their fair premium
under high eﬀort.
This property requires the slope of the impatient types’ indiﬀerence curve with-
out insurance (P = 0 and I = 0) not to be ﬂatter than the fair premium line under
high eﬀort. This is captured by the following condition:
sh <
δishU′(w − L)
U′(w)
Proposition 3 Assume that P-2 and P-3 hold and that the impatient types’ discount
factor δi is such that ICi through D (ﬁgure 4) cuts EBp above A but below B at some
point E, and ICp through E is always below the fair pooling line. If assumptions
1 and 2 hold true, then there exists a unique separating equilibrium in which both
types employ high eﬀort. The patient types buy proﬁt-making contract E and the
impatient types buy zero proﬁt contract D.
Proof Both types are strictly better oﬀ than without insurance. The impatient
types are indiﬀerent between their own contract D and the patient types’ contract
E. Therefore, it is assumed that the impatient types buy their own contract D.
Deviations from D are not an issue, as D maximizes the impatient types’ expected
utility subject to a zero proﬁt by construction.
Deviations from E to the left of EBp: It does not pay to oﬀer a contract above
ICp through E. This is because above ICi through D no customer can be attracted.
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Figure 4: Both types feature a kink in their indiﬀerence curves. There is a separating
equilibrium in which both types employ high eﬀort. The patient types buy contract E
(proﬁt-making) whereas the impatient types buy contract D (zero proﬁt).
Below it, only impatient types who employ low eﬀort can be attracted, what leads to
losses. This also holds true for all points on ICi through D, with the only exemption
being D, since ICi does not cross the fair pooling line to the right of EBi as we look
at the case where E is below B. However, oﬀering D instead of E is not attractive
either, because it involves zero proﬁts. Below ICp through E both customer types
are attracted due to assumption 2. However, since this area is below the fair pooling
line, deviating oﬀers below ICp through E cause losses as well.
To the right of EBp, proﬁtable oﬀers are not possible either. In this region, not
even oﬀers on the fair premium line can attract any patient customers away from
E.
The patient types prefer contract E to any other contract which lies on ICi
through D and is on or above the applicable fair premium line. Therefore, another
separating equilibrium cannot exist.
A pooling equilibrium would have to be on or above the fair pooling line. Since
ICp through E is always below the fair pooling line, there cannot exist a pooling
20equilibrium which would not be destroyed by E. Uniqueness follows. ￿
4.4 Full service versus discount insurers
We use the separating equilibrium of the previous section (ﬁgure 4) as a starting
point and assume now that the insurers can be separated into full service insurers
as well as discount insurers with a less attractive service.3 Service quality shall be
represented by the following stylized fact: Full service insurers are characterized by
a quick and hassle-free payout of indemnities in case the customer reports a loss.
Discount insurers, in contrast, pay indemnities only with a delay. This might be
because they want to save costs by having fewer staﬀ who process claims or by
earning interest on withheld indemnities.
An alternative interpretation of this speciﬁcation could be in terms of exclusive
agents versus independent agents. Kim and Smith (1996) suggest that exclusive
agents are more reluctant when it comes to paying out indemnities while independent
agents provide a better service regarding claims settlement. This is because they
can threaten to move their customers to a diﬀerent insurer if claims are not settled
fairly and promptly.
The expected utility of an individual buying full service insurance is unchanged
with regard to the situation before and given by
EU
F = U(w − P
F) + δ
 
[1 − s(e)]U(w) + s(e)U(w − L + I
F)
 
−c(e),
where superscript F stands for full service insurance.
The expected utility of a consumer buying discount insurance is
EU
D = U(w − P
D) + δ
 
[1 − s(e)]U(w) + s(e)U(w − L + t(δ)I
D)
 
−c(e),
where superscript D stands for discount insurance. We assume that a discount
insurer pays out indemnities with a delay of one period, so the indemnity is paid
out in the third period only. In order to facilitate the analysis, we assume that there
exists a function t(·), with t(δ) < δ for δ ∈ (0,1) and t′(δ) > 0, which transforms
δ in such a way that a consumer is indiﬀerent between receiving t(δ)ID in period 2
and ID in period 3.
By comparing EUF and EUD, information about the relative position of indif-
ference curves under full service (ICF) and under discount insurance (ICD) can be
3We thank Harris Schlesinger for suggesting this issue.
21obtained. Subtracting EUD from EUF while assuming that EUD = EUF yields:
U(w − P
F) − U(w − P
D) + δs(e)[U(w − L + I
F) − U(w − L + t(δ)I
D)] = 0
From this equation it can be seen easily that two indiﬀerence curves ICF and ICD
of a particular patience type δ, representing the same expected utility and the same
eﬀort level, intersect at the same P, if IF = ID = 0. For strictly positive indemnities
and δ < 1, ICD is below ICF for the same eﬀort level. As will be pointed out in
the next paragraph, ICF becomes steeper due to the switch to low eﬀort at a
lower indemnity than ICD. Therefore, ICD is also below ICF for indemnities for
which the eﬀort level is not the same under the two diﬀerent forms of insurance. A
graphical illustration is given in ﬁgure 5. Indiﬀerence curves ICF
p (E) and ICD
p (I)
represent the same expected utility level for patient types, since they intersect at
point H where the corresponding indemnities are zero. In the same line of argument,
ICD
i (J) represents the same expected utility level than ICF
i (D) for impatient types,
since both indiﬀerence curves intersect at point G.
In analogy to (2), the eﬀort border under discount insurance is described by
U(w − L + t(δ)I) = U(w) −
ch − cl
δ(sl − sh)
.
It is apparent that the eﬀort border under discount insurance is located further to
the right in the contract space, if t(δ) < 1.
An example of a situation with product diﬀerentiation is given in ﬁgure 5. There
are four diﬀerent eﬀort borders EBm
n and indiﬀerence curves ICm
n where n ∈ {i,p}
denotes the patience type and m ∈ {F,D} denotes the insurance type (F=full
service, D=discount). Point I marks the intersection of ICD
p (I) and EBD
p . Point J
denotes the intersection of ICD
i (J) and EBD
p .
Before proceeding to the analysis of equilibria, we introduce a modiﬁcation of
assumption 2:
Assumption 3 Even under high eﬀort eh, a patient type (δp) has a steeper indiﬀer-
ence curve than an impatient type (δi) under low eﬀort el for any discount insurance
contract {P D,ID}.
In order not to inﬂate the scope of this article, we want to focus on one case only:
It is not possible to make the impatient types better oﬀ in comparison to full service
contract D with a discount contract that is not loss-making. This requires that
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Figure 5: Situation with product diﬀerentiation in which I is above F and J is below
F. This allows for a separating zero-proﬁt equilibrium in which both types employ high
eﬀort. Impatient types buy full service insurance contract D, whereas patient types buy
discount insurance contract F.
ICD
i (J) (ﬁgure 5) is always below the applicable fair premium line under discount
insurance, which is based on sh to the left of EBD
i and sl to the right of it.
Deﬁnition 1 The area between ICD
p (I) and ICD
i (J) which is above sh is deﬁned as
the “incentive compatible improvement area for the patient types” (ICIAP).
In this area, the patient types can be made better oﬀ in comparison to E with a
discount insurance contract without attracting impatient types away from their full
service contract D. Furthermore, an insurer who oﬀers a contract in ICIAP achieves
at least a zero proﬁt, if the patient types employ high eﬀort.
Regarding the following proposition, point F (ﬁgure 5) is deﬁned to be the
23intersection of EBD
p and the fair premium line under high eﬀort.
Proposition 4 Assume P-2 and P-3 hold in the presence of product diﬀerentiation,
an ICD
p (I) which is always below the fair premium line under low eﬀort, an ICD
p (F)
which is steeper than sh to the left of EBD
p , an ICD
i (J) which is always below the
applicable fair premium line and the fair pooling line under discount insurance, and
an ICF
p (E) which is always below the fair pooling line under full service insurance
(ﬁgure 5). If there is an ICIAP to the left of EBD
p , discount insurance can attract
patient customers away from the proﬁtable full service contract E, and one of the
following equilibria arises:
a) If ICIAP contains F, then a unique zero-proﬁt separating equilibrium arises
in which both types employ high eﬀort. Impatient types buy full service contract D,
whereas patient types buy discount insurance contract F (ﬁgure 5).
b) If ICIAP does not contain F, but a point like J below I on the edge of ICIAP,
then a unique separating equilibrium arises in which both types employ high eﬀort.
Impatient types buy full service contract D, which yields a zero proﬁt, whereas patient
types buy discount insurance contract J, which yields a positive proﬁt.
Proof If there is an ICIAP area to the left of EBD
p , then insurers can make
the patient types better oﬀ in comparison to full service contract E. In addition,
insurers will achieve at least a zero proﬁt by doing so, since only patient high eﬀort
types will be attracted by such discount policies and the ICIAP area is deﬁned to
be above the fair premium line under high eﬀort, which is based on sh.
Now we consider part a) of the proposition when ICIAP contains F. The con-
sumers’ participation constraint is met, since both contracts D and F make the
respective consumer types better oﬀ than having no insurance.
As to stability of D, it is impossible to attract impatient types away from D with
a discount policy which would be proﬁtable. This is because ICD
i (J) is assumed
to be always below the applicable fair premium line under discount insurance and
to intersect EBD
p at some point J which is below F. Therefore, competition be-
tween insurers oﬀering a discount policy to the patient types is not limited by the
incentive compatibility constraint, as insurers run into zero proﬁts ﬁrst. Moreover,
it is impossible to attract impatient types away from D by oﬀering any other full
service contract which would not be loss-making. This is because D is maximizing
the impatient types’ expected utility subject to a zero proﬁt by construction.
24Also contract F is stable. It is assumed that ICD
p (F) is steeper than sh to the
left of EBD
p . Moreover, it follows from the assumptions that it is below the fair
premium line under low eﬀort to the right of EBD
p . Therefore, the best discount
contract for the patient types which does not inﬂict losses upon insurers is the corner
solution at point F. This contract makes the patient types employ high eﬀort and
involves a zero proﬁt for insurers. Deviations from F oﬀering discount contracts are
not an issue. In order to attract patient types away from F they would have to be
loss-making.
As to uniqueness, the impatient types prefer full service contract D to any other
full service contract which lies on or above the applicable fair premium line. Oﬀering
discount insurance to impatient customers which would provide the same level of
expected utility to them as D is impossible, since ICD
i (J) is assumed to be always
below the applicable fair premium line. The patient types prefer discount insurance
contract F to any other full or discount insurance contract which is on or above the
applicable fair premium line. Therefore, there can be no other separating equilibrium
than {D,F}.
A discount pooling equilibrium would have to be on or above the fair pooling
line under discount insurance. However, ICD
i (J) is assumed to be always below the
fair pooling line under discount insurance. Therefore, the impatient types would not
want to buy such a pooling contract. Since ICF
p (E) is assumed to be always below
the fair pooling line under full service insurance, there can be no full service pooling
equilibrium either, because it would be destroyed by E. Uniqueness follows.
With regard to part b) of the proposition, the participation constraint of the
consumers is met as well, because both patience types are better oﬀ than without
insurance.
Showing the stability of D follows the same line of reasoning as under part
a). However, this time competition between insurers oﬀering discount insurance to
patient types is limited by the incentive compatibility constraint, which is binding
at point J.
Now we challenge the stability of J by considering deviating discount contracts.
As J is below ICD
p (I), which represents indiﬀerence to ICF
p (E), deviations involving
full service contracts are irrelevant, since even the best non-loss-making full service
contract E makes the patient types worse oﬀ than J.
To the left of EBD
p , oﬀering a discount contract above ICD
p (J) does not make
sense: Above ICD
p (J) and below ICD
i (J) only impatient types can be attracted. To
25the right of EBD
i , they employ low eﬀort, which results in a loss. To the left of EBD
i ,
they employ high eﬀort, but since ICD
i (J) is assumed to be always below the fair
premium line under discount insurance, this results in a loss as well. Above ICD
i (J)
no customers can be attracted. Due to assumption 3, deviating oﬀers below ICD
p (J)
would attract both types of customers. However, since this region is below the fair
pooling line under discount insurance, such deviations are loss-making. To the right
of EBD
p , there are no proﬁtable deviations either. This is because the patient types
employ low eﬀort and can not even be attracted away from J with contracts on
the fair premium line under discount insurance and low eﬀort, resulting in a loss
probability of sl.
As to uniqueness, the impatient types prefer full service contract D to any other
full service contract which lies on or above the applicable fair premium line. Of-
fering discount insurance which would provide the same level of expected utility to
impatient customers as D is impossible without incurring a loss. This is because
ICD
i (J) is assumed to be always below the applicable fair premium line. The pa-
tient types prefer discount insurance contract J to any other full service or discount
insurance contract which is on or above the applicable fair premium line and meets
the incentive compatibility condition. As a result, there can be no other separating
equilibrium than {D,J}.
A discount pooling equilibrium would have to be on or above the fair pooling
line under discount insurance. However, ICD
i (J) is assumed to be always below the
fair pooling line under discount insurance. Therefore, the impatient types would not
want to buy such a pooling contract. Since ICF
p (E) is always below the fair pooling
line under full service insurance, there can be no full service pooling equilibrium
either because it would be destroyed by E. Uniqueness follows. ￿
5 Conclusion
In this article we employ a 2-period competitive insurance model, which is charac-
terized by the simultaneous presence of moral hazard and adverse selection. Moral
hazard is modelled along the traditional lines and is assumed to occur with regard
to unobservable precautionary eﬀort which can either be high or low. However, ad-
verse selection occurs with regard to the personal discount rate of consumers which
can be high or low as well. It is assumed that consumers decide whether or not
to buy insurance in the ﬁrst period. If so, they have to pay the premium up-front
and decide about the precautionary eﬀort level they wish to employ. In the second
26period, the consumer faces the risk of a loss. This setup is meant to capture the
fact that real world insurance contracts usually require the consumer to pay the
premium up-front for several periods (e.g. 12 months) which creates a role for the
consumer’s personal discount rate in the ex-ante valuation of contracts.
The diﬀerent time preference among consumers opens the door for separating
equilibria in which the patient types employ a high eﬀort level and buy high cover,
while impatient types employ low eﬀort and buy little or even no cover. Since high
eﬀort implies low risk and vice versa, this result is equivalent to saying that the low
risks are more fond of buying insurance. Thus, the prevailing outcome is the opposite
of the traditional adverse selection theory where adverse selection takes place with
regard to consumer risk types. Furthermore, it is possible that the equilibrium
contract for the patient types is proﬁtable. In this case, undercutting the premium
would attract all the impatient types who employ a low eﬀort. This would result in
a loss for the insurer.
Ex-ante randomization enables insurers to compete away any proﬁts, however
the validity of this concept for the real world insurance market is doubtful since it is
not observed in practice. Ex post randomization, on the other hand, is not capable
to increase expected utility of the patient types in comparison to the deterministic
equilibrium contract. Thus there is no better separation of types and proﬁts persist.
A further way of how proﬁts with the patient types can be competed away is by
introducing diﬀerentiated insurance products in the form of full service and discount
insurance. We think of discount insurers as having a service which is not as good.
We assume that the service level is deﬁned by the (expected) delay with which an
insurer pays out indemnities in case of a loss. Since patient consumers do not mind a
later payment that much, this kind of product diﬀerentiation can potentially achieve
a better separation of agents which allows for competing down remaining proﬁts.
In this model we abstract from the existence of a capital market. If consumers
can borrow and transfer money between periods, this will surely have a substantial
impact on the power of using consumers’ time preference as a screening device.
However, capital market imperfections like borrowing constraints and deviations
between the consumers’ personal discount rate and the market interest rate might
still be interesting issues to be analyzed in the context of this model. We leave this
for future research.
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